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Abstract: 
In this paper we attempt a good unearthing, sound tackling and effective pointing 
out of the critical key features permeating one of the two cornerstones supporting 
the total coordination and interplay underlying the complex epistemonic and scie-
ntific method: and that would be the constituent methodology concisely known 
under the cover name “analytic method”. In this attempt, however, it becomes evi-
dent very soon that the direct similarities, reciprocities and complementarities to 
the other cornerstone, concisely known as “abstractive method”, must also be laid 
out concurrently; the two share the same needs and behaviours, while they must 
also be mutually disambiguated and framed in inner consistencies and mutual 
contrast, to assert proper theoretical coverage, fruitful application and mutual 
impermeability overall. 
Thus, both of them end up being discussed in parallel. To that end, simple and 
intuitively appealing proposals are sought, expressed and projected, regarding their 
key attributes, range and boundaries, both generally and especially in between 
them; their defining points and most essential requirements are sought out and 
expressed, their functional standards are suggested and the stages of its application 
are prescribed, according to a shadowy yet rigorous gradual breakup and asse-
mbling procedure derived from elementary combinatorics and set theory. All this 
gets illustrated in the schematic stages to be pursued in two relevant enlightening 
analytic examples, chosen so as to also partake of a crucial share of an abstractive 
aspect. 
Two relevant issues are touched upon along the way in the vein of the present 
tone of quest, namely those concerning basic prerequisites of logic employed and 
the confusion and effective double-talk underlying the term “theory” (vs. “theo-
ries”) and the consequent term-induced ambiguity in the concepts. On the subject, 
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analysis is the breakup of an “entity” into its “components” and synthesis is its re-
troactive operation, or “return”, from “components” to the “entity”. Similarly, “ab-
straction” is the course from an entity to a nesting of successive general categories, 
and “structure” is the other way around from more general categories towards 
smaller contained assemblages of entities, each uniformly exhibiting “partial ma-
nifestations” of the said categorical feature. 
The semantic context and its set-theoretical implications are of paramount 
importance here. What is definitively taken as a “unity”, in each case, is a matter of 
choice, and of mutual and binding agreement among the parties conducting the study 
and its discussion. Beyond that, figuratively speaking, the analytic method concerns 
“anatomical autopsies” digging into such unities constituting elements or members of 
sets, whereas the abstractive method concerns attributes connecting sets of such 
“unities” and their nested supersets and subsets. We close by sketching the stage-by-
stage application as illustrated in two case-studies: one from Cultural Studies, 
regarding a model, focusing on the primitive ternary ritual of the perfo-rming arts 
[ΚΛΜ], discussed complete with some key side issues, and accompanied by 
considerations on the triple of the material arts [ΧΨΩ], and then one from Bioethics 
regarding all possible partial and combinatorial constituents in consent models. 
 
Keywords: Analytic method, Abstract method, Scientific & Epistemonic method, 
Set theory, Theory, Primitive ritual, ΚΛΜ, ΨΧΩ, Consent 
 
Περίληψη: 
Σε αυτή την εργασία επιχειρούμε να διαχειριστούμε με επάρκεια ένα από τα κρίσι-
μα βασικά χαρακτηριστικά της επιστήμης, διεισδύοντας  σε έναν από τους δύο α-
κρογωνιαίους λίθους που υποβαστάζουν το συνολικό δόμημά της, όντας στη βάση 
του πλέγματος της θεωρητικής και εφαρμοσμένης επιστημονικής μεθόδου: πρόκει-
ται για τη συνιστώσα μεθοδολογία που είναι συνοπτικά γνωστή υπό την επωνυμία 
«αναλυτική μέθοδος». Σε αυτήν την προσπάθεια, ωστόσο, γίνεται σύντομα προφα-
νές ότι οι άμεσες ομοιότητες, αμοιβαιότητες και συμπληρωματικότητες με τον άλ-
λο ακρογωνιαίο λίθο, γνωστό και υπό την επωνυμία «αφηρημένη μέθοδος», πρέπει 
επίσης να καθοριστούν ταυτόχρονα. Οι δύο μοιράζονται τις ίδιες ανάγκες και συ-
μπεριφορές, ενώ πρέπει επίσης να είναι αμοιβαία αποσαφηνισμένες και πλαισιω-
μένες ως προς τις εσωτερικές συνεκτικές και αμοιβαίες αντιθέσεις τους, ώστε να 
διασφαλίζεται η ορθή θεωρητική τους κάλυψη, η εποικοδομητική εφαρμογή και η 
αμοιβαία στεγανότητα συνολικά. 
Έτσι, και οι δύο καταλήγουν να συζητούνται εν παραλλήλω. Προς τον σκοπό 
αυτό, αναζητούνται, εκφράζονται και προβάλλονται απλές και διαισθητικά ελκυ-
στικές προτάσεις όσον αφορά τα βασικά χαρακτηριστικά τους, το εύρος και τα 
όριά τους, τόσο γενικά όσο και, κυρίως, ειδικά μεταξύ τους. Προσδιορίζονται τα 
καθοριστικά τους σημεία και οι βασικές απαιτούμενες προδιαγραφές τους, προτεί-
νονται τα λειτουργικά τους πρότυπα και προδιαγράφονται τα στάδια της εφαρμο-
γής τους, σύμφωνα με μια σκιώδη, μεν, αλλά αυστηρή σταδιακή διαδικασία διά-
σπασης και συναρμολόγησης, με προέλευση από τη στοιχειώδη συνδυαστική ανά-
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λυση και θεωρία συνόλων. Όλα αυτά απεικονίζονται στα ακολουθητέα σχηματικά 
στάδια σε δύο διαφωτιστικά αναλυτικά παραδείγματα, επιλεγμένα  έτσι ώστε να 
μετέχουν κρίσιμων όψεων του αφαιρετικού σκέλους. 
Δύο συναφή ζητήματα προσεγγίζονται κατά την πορεία διά μέσου του παρό-
ντος τόνου αναζήτησης, δηλαδή εκείνα που αφορούν βασικές προϋποθέσεις της 
χρησιμοποιούμενης λογικής, όσο και της σύγχυσης και διγλωσσίας που υποκρύ-
πτονται στον όρο «θεωρία» (αντιπβ. «θεωρίες») αλλά και της συνακόλουθης γλωσ-
σογενούς αμφισημίας ως προς τις έννοιες. Σχετικά πάλι με το βασικό μας θέμα, η 
ανάλυση είναι η διάσπαση μιας  «οντότητας» στα «συστατικά» της, και η σύνθεση 
είναι η ανάδρομη προς αυτήν λειτουργία, ή η «επιστροφή» από τα «συστατικά» 
πίσω στην «οντότητα». Ομοίως, η «αφαίρεση» είναι η πορεία από μίαν οντότητα 
προς τους «εμφωλευμένους» αναβαθμούς αλληλοδιάδοχων όλο και γενικότερων 
κατηγοριών, ενώ η «δομή» είναι η επιστροφή από τις γενικότερες κατηγορίες προς 
όλο και στενότερες εμπεριεχόμενες συλλογές οντοτήτων, με τρόπο ώστε η κάθε 
μία τους να εμφανίζει  ομοιόμορφα «μερικές εκδηλώσεις» του εν λόγω κατηγορι-
κού χαρακτηριστικού. 
Το σημασιολογικό πλαίσιο και οι συνολοθεωρητικές του επιπτώσεις είναι 
υψίστης σημασίας εδώ. Ό,τι ορισμικά λαμβάνεται ως ενότητα, στην κάθε περίπτω-
ση, είναι θέμα επιλογής και αμοιβαίας και δεσμευτικής συμφωνίας μεταξύ των με-
ρών που διεξάγουν τη μελέτη και την επ' αυτής συζήτηση. Πέρα από αυτό, μι-
λώντας πιο σχηματικά, η αναλυτική μέθοδος αφορά «ανατομικές αυτοψίες» εντός 
ενοτήτων που αποτελούν στοιχεία ή μέλη συνόλων, ενώ η αφαιρετική μέθοδος 
αφορά χαρακτηριστικά κατηγορήματα που συνδέουν σύνολα τέτοιων «ενοτήτων» 
και των εμφωλευμένων υπερ- και υποσυνόλων τους. Κλείνουμε σκιαγραφώντας 
την κατά στάδια εφαρμογή της μεθόδου, όπως αυτή φαίνεται παραδειγματικά σε 
δύο μελέτες περιπτώσεων: μία από το χώρο των Πολιτιστικών Μελετών, σχετικά 
με ένα μοντέλο εστιασμένο  στην πρωτογενή τριφυή τελετουργία των παραστα-
τικών τεχνών [ΚΛΜ], το οποίο παρουσιάζεται ολόκληρο μαζί με την επιπλέον κά-
λυψη μερικών καίριων παράπλευρων θεμάτων και συνοδεύεται από βασικές σκέ-
ψεις για το τριμελές σύνολο των υλικών ή αποτελεστικών τεχνών [ΧΨΩ], ενώ α-
κολουθεί μελέτη περίπτωσης από τη Βιοηθική, σχετικά με όλα τα πιθανά μερικά 
και συνδυαστικά συστατικά σε μοντέλα συγκατάθεσης. 
 
Λέξεις κλειδιά: Αναλυτική μέθοδος, Αφαιρετική μέθοδος, Επιστημονική Μέθο-
δος, Θεωρία Συνόλων, Θεωρία, Πρωτόγονο τριφυές, ΚΛΜ, ΨΧΩ, Συναίνεση. 
 
1. Introduction 
The analytic method is a key constituent in the overall methodology of epistēmē – 
progenitor of science (Παπαγεωργίου & Λέκκας, 2014). When referring to the 
scientific method, what comes to mind is the “experimental method”. But is that, or 
indeed, should that really be the principal methodology of science? There cannot 
be any experiment without bonds to a theory, all grave complications regarding the 
ambiguous semantics between Greek (abstract) θεωρία (theōriā) and Latin-derived 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 06:42:03 |
Analytic Method 73 
(concrete, empiricist) theory/-ies notwithstanding, because those two are NOT the 
same thing. Other than that, experiments are doubly theory-laden: experiments in 
fact test “theories”; the very structure of the tested theory dictates the experimental 
procedure at least partly. All the other parts of the experiment, observations of its 
outcome included, are also dictated by still other theories – most of them taken for 
granted (a ceteris paribus clause is mandatory in order to ensure a controllable 
environment). Therefore, the main focus of the epistemonic methodological 
toolbox essentially underlying the scientific methodology cannot be the 
experimental procedure; that can only be the focus of laboratory staff. The 
epicentre of science can only be related to the association to theory proper and 
elaboration in and towards theories; that is what the analytic method and its 
companion counterparts are initially all about. 
Theory, in the original and proper sense of the term, is an abstract construct, 
obtained no matter how, subject to certain criteria and freely used as an a priori 
organizing, describing, explaining, predicting and modeling factor for reality, if 
deemed to be an appropriate such factor and to the extent that it is and by the 
people who have agreed to accept it as such and for the realities concerned, which 
are then treated as an applied field of this applicable theory. If, in language and in 
common intuition, there is an antonymic distinction between theory and practice, 
then what else is the empirical observational scientific method if not an overview 
of “reality”, and what is “reality” after all, especially as the source and depot of 
observational science? Is it theory or is it practice? Are observations and expe-
riments theory, or are they practice in performance? 
The overall epistemonic method puts theory proper in an external and preceding 
relationship to phenomena and uses it as a source of proposed and attempted 
screenplays, so to speak. If something fails, it is not the theory that is to blame, but 
a “mismatch” between phenomenon studied and theory employed or “developed”, 
as the criteria for theory are external. What do we mean by this? For example, there 
are no observations of anything conceivable that could render the theoretical ope-
ration of exponentiation obsolete or, worse, “proven wrong”; misapplied maybe, 
useless in the situation at hand perhaps, but wrong no! Other than that, a pure 
theoretical epistemonic method or constituent methodological tool / “sub-method”, 
in its constitutional status, and if it is to be of any use, ought to be essentially 
logical, necessarily consistent, as complete as possible, precise, clear-cut, as co-
mpact within itself as we can make it and maximally theoretically productive: the 
more the better. Its fitness for application is to be judged solely on the ground of its 
interpreting and modeling (and predicting) effectiveness. As for the logic 
employed, we stand by a principle that it ought to be everything we know about 
pure rigorous formal logic, but with three added desired attributes at its core: that it 
had better be clear and clear-cut and sure, that it had better be as unique as feasible 
(i.e. not be multi-faceted, multiple and alternative) and that it had better never 
challenge intuition to the point of annulment (i.e. be counter-intuitive or even not-
so-intuitive), because our mammalian brains have certain ways of analogy built 
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round concepts and procedures, which have made us survive and which are always 
mobilized in our conception and expression, and which drive our “understanding”. 
If some “logic(s)” go(es) against these principles, as far as we are concerned, it 
simply isn’t good enough, especially for science, and we simply have to try harder 
to do better. The telic reason – i.e. our very objective – why we even bother to do 
science, is to come up with good reliable trustworthy answers; if not, then we are 
conceivably facing a partial institutional failure. No one likes to ask a scientific 
question about the medication needed towards fixing the health of their child or 
towards securing the stability of the building they live in, just to get a “fuzzy” or 
“multiple-choice” answer, and a clear-cut verdict is always preferable to a gam-
bleng one; at least so we trust. If we are to use logic towards studying “fact” and 
“reality”, then, par excellence, logic had better make sense in the “good” sense of 
the words, rather than creating its own universes, sensory or otherwise, or, worse, 
making nonsense that would then be trying to pass as sense or, even worse, actually 
managing to do so upon mental attributes of self-consistency and such, especially 
circular and self-referential ones. 
Thus, the scientific and epistemonic methods work in complementary opposite 
senses; to the former, the real world is an empirical depot and the scientific model 
is a desired result of practical models preferably working on and reflecting external 
and independent theoretical principle; to science / the sciences, the real world is an 
atempted and proposed source field of factual data manifesting themselves to our 
senses, “perceived, conceived and understood” in our neurons analogically, and 
serves as a nurturing world of ἐμπειρία (empeiria: experience); in contrast, to 
episteme, the real world is an attempted and proposed terminal field of archetypal 
abstract theory applied, and serves as an attempted world of ἐποπτεία (epopteia: 
overview, manifestation). 
On the organizing and real level, now, both the epistemonic method and its applied 
scientific counterpart make extensive use of two distinct constituent methods or sub-
methods, both of which are twofold – at least this structure is dictated by a direct 
association to set theory. Now, the reason why set theory should have anything to do 
with the way in which science forms its methodology may only be understood to the 
extent that one accepts the classical mathematical “toolbox” as the desired absolute 
standard for abstract thought – which is, in the end, what theories are: abstract 
statements without a priori practically focused meaning for the world – or, equally, 
abstract statements with the capacity to host any meaning deemed appropriate. 
A brief historical note is in order now, after which a practical illustration of the 
analytic method will be presented. The paper will conclude with two case studies 
manifesting an essential facet of the applicability of successive stages of the ana-
lytic method. 
 
2. Historical perspective 
As we all know, the orthodox analytic (sub-)method consists of two stages, 
analysis and synthesis, as a pair-wise coordinated key component of both standard 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 06:42:03 |
Analytic Method 75 
methods: epistemonic and scientific. In order to better understand it, we should 
really create a frame for it and set it apart from other similar things, i.e. fulfil a task 
of compacting, framing and disambiguating it. The first step is to determine scopes, 
specify meanings and straighten out the semantics by defining in a theoretically 
advantageous fashion. In the beginning it looks as though the concepts might be 
better approached through their history, beginning in classical Greece, where we 
read that the various components of the analytic method were key-methods in 
mathematical proof. However it seems that these terms have oftentimes been used 
too broadly or too loosely, creating overlaps and even confusions with other 
methodical tools which we wish to keep separate, for reasons of rigour. 
Our best bet, then, in clearing things up at the source, is, as was already mentio-
ned above, is to define, frame and disambiguate, by first reverting to i. the dubious 
but potentially marginally useful aspect of etymology and ii. a careful observation 
of historical practice. By etymology, then, the Latin counterparts and cognates of 
these terms are i. ἀνάλυσις (analysis) = resolutio, breaking up (and into?) and ii. 
σύνθεσις (synthesis) = compositio, putting together. The rest of ancient history, in 
its grand vision for quest, has not really always stayed faithful to this literal inter-
pretation, thus operating against clarity and oftentimes pushing the terminology to 
overlaps and ambiguities and confusions. 
“Analysis is the obtaining of the thing sought by assuming it and so reasoning 
up to an admitted truth; synthesis is the obtaining of the thing sought by reasoning 
up to the inference and proof of it” (Euclid, XIII.5 as framed by Eudoxus, Cajori 
1894 p. 31). This is the oldest definition of mathematical analysis being contrasted 
to synthesis. Analysis was “a method of discovery, in which you consider the 
properties of the thing you want to find and deduce what it must be like”, and 
synthesis was “a method of disclosure, in which you state what the result must be, 
without explanation, and prove you are right” (Hodgkin 2005 p. 39). 
The methodology of analysis and synthesis was implicitly utilized by Hippo-
crates of Chios and others; but its explicit formalization was delivered no sooner 
than Plato’s time, when he and his school “turned the instinctive logic into a cons-
cious, legitimate method” (Cajori 1894 p. 30). Plato himself distinguishes two 
processes that bear striking similarities to the structural logic of analysis and 
synthesis. Both begin from hypotheses. The former method treats hypotheses as 
first principles, builds upon them and arrives at conclusions – the method of mathe-
matics. The latter uses the hypotheses as mere stepping-stones for mounting higher 
and higher, until the absolute ideal and the principle of all things is reached. Here 
there is nothing hypothetical and one may descend again and arrive to certainties in 
a process that no longer needs any sensible images. This is the dialectic way (Heath 
1921 pp. 290-292). Yet there still is nothing here diversifying by nature and scope 
of the assumption; besides, Plato’s dialectic is more than analysis and synthesis, as 
it has elements of abstraction and structure, concepts we shall cover next. Howe-
ver it is in the school of Aristotle where we encounter purer forms of analysis and 
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synthesis in their presently accepted sense, even though they may not be expressly 
stated as such. 
Awareness and the specifications of the process of abstraction, on the other 
hand, in its clear form, is a more contemporary product of mathematicians who 
seem to have recently led their preference for it to a peak (Hodgin 2005 p. 236). 
“Bourbakists”, named after N. Bourbaki (… a collective pseudonym), is a move-
ment of the 20
th
 century with the intention to drive to a more abstract view of ma-
thematics (Hodgin 2005 p. 240). 
Is abstraction so powerful? Reviel Netz, in his 2003 book The Shaping of 
Deduction in Greek Mathematics, concludes in page 214: 
 
“I suggest therefore that one part of the answer to ‘why are Greek mathematical proofs 
the way they are?’ is that proofs are compartmentalised from broader discussions, so 
that their structure is wholly autonomous. When doing mathematics, one does nothing 
else. Instead of the multidimensional structure of interests and implications of natural 
discourse, Greek mathematics abstracts mathematical relationships. (…) the structure of 
Greek mathematical proofs is a direct, uninterrupted act of persuasion. Paradoxically, 
this ideal can be more perfectly achieved only when the mathematical discourse is 
abstracted from any context, when it is no longer part of the reallife acts of persuasion, 
but, rather, an artificial exercise in a compartmentalised domain. The ideal of real-life 
persuasion survives and reaches perfection when abstracted from its origins. Is this 
perhaps parallel to the developpment of the Socratic discourse, from its real-life origins, 
through its gradual Platonic idealisation, to its Aristotelian abstract, general reform-
lation?” (Netz 2003 p. 214) 
 
The power of abstract proof is exactly the lack of external content that liberates 
thought from biases and ideologies that are anchored in observation. The validity 
of the dialectic method is confirmed not only by its accommodating capacity in 
regard to past observations, but almost uniquely by predictions. Zeno’s paradoxes, 
and his abstract conception of continuum and discretum as the boundary conditions 
of the ad infinitum divisibility, led Democritus to the perception of atom, and fo-
retold the modern atomic and calculus theories (see for example Heath 1921 pp. 
275-238). 
As synthesis is the counterpart of analysis, an analogous question arises 
regarding the opposite-sense counterpart of abstraction. For reasons loosely 
dwelling in the considerations put forth below, and understood through them, as 
suggested in the work of many scholars directly or indirectly, we take the respon-
sibility of designating this counterpart as structure, intuitively at least, in the 
singular unambiguous sense of the Greek term δομή and not in any one of the other 
senses indiscriminately crammed into semantic confusion under the same term in 
the Latin tradition of other European languages (cf. Λέκκας 2003c p. 204). 
 
3. Analysis – synthesis and abstraction – structure 
The modern use of the two epistemonic (sub-)methods, i.e. analytic and abstract, 
especially in a most notable complementary sense, can be brought to correspond to 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 06:42:03 |
Analytic Method 77 
key developments of Set Theory that took place in the late 19
th
 and 20
th
 century. An 
epitome of the relevant quest and its results were concisely conceived and 
formulated by the second author of the present paper, in his effort to determine 
crucial issues regarding the arts for the of the Greek Open University; they are 
exposed in his relevant writings starting from the publication of the wider-scope 
textbooks for a course in Overview of Greek Music and Dance (see Λέκκας, 2003a, 
b and c). The first thing that became clear, in association with the scientific method 
also here applicable to Cultural Studies, is the nature of the initial first and starting 
stage of observation. One essentially observes an entity and/or a procedure 
regarding that entity, which is deemed as one, i.e. as a single observable unit, or as 
a well-determined collection of such singularly identifiable entities, capable of 
being observed one at a time. 
Thus, the concept of an observed unit / unity or clear multiplicity of identifiable 
unities is clear and depends on scope and on common consensus (i.e. acceptance of 
agreement) for those involved and agreeing to participate in the procedure and in 
its discussion; and then a continuum will be regarded as “one item”. Regardless of 
how arbitrary or conventional or opportunistic this choice of focal unit may be, it 
becomes binding for the rest of the study for the people agreeing to accept the 
convention for as long as they accept it, irrelevant as it might be to others – but that 
is… irrelevant. 
From then on, breaking up a unity, thus determined, is like dissecting an ele-
ment or member of the set into constituents, whereas combining unities on the 
basis of the concept of categorical criteria, such as “properties” or “attributes”, 
corresponds to collecting, grouping and forming supersets and subsets. This dicho-
tomy is elementary and sine qua non in set theory, whereas scientists and theorists 
do not seem to have introduced its incumbent distinction in the epistemonic and 
scientific methods, or at least have been conscious of it; curiously enough, the first 
place where it has appeared and analyzed are our second author’s said prior recent 
writings. According to the pathway he follows, an observable unity or unitary 
procedure is “one” and “synthetic / compound” by our agreement on its nature, 
thus digging into it and its constituents is analytic. On the other hand, these 
(singular) “one’s”, being able to be taken “one at a time”, are collectible in a course 
of generalizing upwards developing abstraction, which can be reversed in a do-
wnward direction of more and more specification until we get back to “one” 
(instantiation?) and this inverse direction underlies the whole idea of structure, 
according to this concept. And this viewing is what dictates the operating gui-
delines set further on in his writings and further below here. 
Set theory (or naïve set theory) is the structured approach to our intuitive (… 
naïve) understanding of how we make collections of “things”, be they similar or 
not. Especially for similar objects, or objects that share at least one characteristic, 
we may describe the set using a criterion – thus not being obliged to describe all 
and every object by name. The whole development of set theory revolves round 
two items: sets and elements of sets. This distinction is crucial not only for mathe-
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matics – a ubiquitous staple in all axiomatic formulations ever so far – but also for 
our most basic understanding of the world. The distinction between elements and 
sets bears analogies to the distinction between things and properties (metaphysics), 
matter and mind (metaphysics), objects and their predicates (logic). Logic is also 
based on this fundamental distinction, as predicated (thus quantifiable) objects are 
its only non-logical elements. If we are to base our understanding of the world on 
logic and on set theory, we are going to use a cocktail of the analytic and abstract 
methods which are the outcome not only of this basic distinction, but also of the 
resulting calculus among set-members, sets and all their possible combinations. 
One essential constituent pair of the general epistemonic (/ scientific) metho-
dology is, then, the said analytic method. It refers to specific objects, phenomena or 
processes. As we already mentioned, it encompasses two stages, analysis and sy-
nthesis (cf. Λέκκας 2003a pp. 97-98). In the former stage, “simple” components 
are designated (or defined) and, in the latter stage, constructions are set up, invo-
lving simple components identified in the former stage as their building blocks. 
The second essential constituent pair of the epistemonic (/ scientific) metho-
dology is the abstract method. It refers to categories of objects, phenomena and 
processes and to their groupings with regard to properties. These categories are 
also known under a different equivalent scope as predicates. Thus, a category is 
but a set of objects etc., subject to considerations and allowed procedures akin to 
the axiom of choice in set theory: each and every member of the set is an ideal 
representative / example, i.e. typical, sufficient and equivalent, in the sense that any 
representative / example is as good as any other. Properties, then, are but criteria of 
inclusion in such sets. The former essentially generalizing stage of the abstractive 
method is abstraction and thus, by mere semantics and methodological direction-
nality, the latter essentially specializing / specifying one comes out to be structure. 
Just as in the previous pair, abstraction is a process of forming or conceiving nested 
series of supersets, and structure is the mental conception of objects by means of 
their membership in overlying categories by nested inclusion or, something equi-
valent, the spotting of subcategories all the way to particular objects viewed as 
singletons, i.e. one-element sets, fully bearing the particular qualities or properties 
on the bottom step of the ladder of a set level: a set containing a single element 
carrying all desired properties and attributes or designed and built so as to carry 
them. In all cases, one contrasting feature between the abstract and analytic dire-
ctions ought to be and stay absolutely clear, though the scientific approach has 
consistently and persistently been failing to mention or even conceive of this ultra-
elementary distinction: 
x ≠ {x} 
In this fashion, analysis is the breakup of an entity, or member / element, into its 
particular components, and synthesis is the “return” from components back to the 
element / entity. By the same token, abstraction is the course from a particular 
compact entity to more and more general categories, and structure is the “return” 
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from general categories towards entities they contain, each fully exhibiting the said 
categorical features. 
It is obvious now that, however similar these two processes are and irrespective 
of the fact that they share one and the same starting point, they diverge towards 
opposite directions. Thus, the ensuing danger is grave: to confuse these two 
methods, as in confusing elements, alias members, and singletons, therefore sets; 
and, thence, to classify things based on properties, only to treat them as differing 
instrumentally – which is not necessarily the same: not at all. The myth of 
Frankenstein embodies the collective subconscious anxiety of how to structure a 
collection of parts – structure, life in this case, is a property, an epiphenomenon, 
not identified in a unique way with any combination of elements. Another such 
deviation of thought would be to kill a person (an analytic component) in order to 
punish a nation (an abstract-structural entity), as some terrorists attempt when they 
capture live soldiers on missions. 
The discussion immediately following stems directly from the preceding 
development. Two facts ought to be obvious already: 
a. a predicate, a quality or a property, being a feature of nested supersets, is not 
a “content”, but indeed a container, because it is the marker of a superset, 
not of a subset; 
b. synthesis and structure are two procedures of opposite senses, as they both 
constitute returns to the entity / singleton and/or its unique element (mem-
ber), except that synthesis returns from the parts to the whole, i.e. it is an 
“ascending” return as though “from within”, whereas structure returns from 
the graded generality of nested supersets through a few identifiable specific 
cases, subset by subset, all the way to the specific case of one entity / set ele-
ment (member of a singleton), i.e. it is a “descending” return as though 
“from above”. 
Consequent rules of thumb regarding directionality of procedure: 
 no analysis without synthesis, no synthesis without analysis, no synthesis 
prior to completion of analysis; 
 no abstraction without structure, no structure without abstraction, no 
structure prior to completion of abstraction; 
 analysis and abstraction run divergently towards the sides in mutually 
opposite senses (away from the unitary entity); similarly, synthesis and 
structure run convergently from the sides towards a common point, i.e. 
towards the unitary entity) in mutually opposite senses. Incidentally, in 
consequence, i. analysis and structure run in the same sense, ii. synthesis and 
abstraction run in the same sense; 
 technically, a combination of n items is not analytically or abstractly to be 
broken up into n individual cases (constituents or members) at once, but 
ought to be gradually driven there by distinct successive identifiable stages, 
in a power-set style, as follows: 
○ 1 combination of n items / “n-tuple”, 
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○ n combinations of (n–1) items / “(n–1)-tuples”, 
○ n(n–1)/2 combinations of (n–2) items / “(n–2)-tuples”, 
○ n(n–1)(n–2)/6 combinations of (n–3) items / “(n–3)-tuples”, 
… 
○ n(n–1)(n–2)/6 triples / combinations of 3 items / triples, 
○ n(n–1)/2 pairs / combinations of 2 items / pairs, 
○ n singular individual items. 
 Similarly, in the opposite sense, a statement of a combination of n individual 
cases of items (constituents or members) into “whole” multiplicities is not to 
be synthetically or structurally fused into one full collection at once, but 
ought to be gradually built up by distinct successive stages (pairs, triples, 
quadruples and so on, the same as the ones right above, in the directly oppo-
site order). 
Note that, as abstraction proceeds upwards to wider and wider containing 
supersets, successive slices of particular “features” of members / examples keep 
being dropped from the image; in other words, more and more blocks of semantic 
content are erased. In this sense, abstraction is a process of gradually diminishing 
the signified of each entity by its joint inclusion with other entities. At the end of 
the road, as soon as one has reached “absolute abstraction”, all one is left with is 
void signifiers with no signified, “totally abstract” concepts / entities / “ideas”, 
whether nameless, symbolic or named in some dummy meta-language. Mathe-
matics is the one branch of the epistemonic method dealing in absolute abstraction 
– cf. what was said above about both the dialectic way disposing of the need for 
sensible images and about abstraction’s riddance from any context (again, Heath 
1921 pp. 290-292 and Netz 2003 p. 214). 
Something else ought to be noted here most emphatically, as a matter of 
essential complementary principle, regarding the nature of both “other ends” of the 
respective methodological ranges. These “other (far) ends”, lying on the opposite 
sides of i. the “elementary” analytical components of a unity at the “bottom” of an 
analysis and ii. of the “all- inclusive” / “most general” / “universal” categories or 
attributes or predicates or properties or criteria at the “far end” of the nested super-
sets of an abstraction, are a matter of a consensus of mutually agreed and accepted 
conventions among the parties concerned too. 
Is there a danger when one attempts to follow the abstract method to its 
extreme? The greatest risk of abstract thinking comes when one deviates from 
mathematical reasoning and starts to daydream relentlessly. There is no danger in 
the alleged uncertainty / relativity of clear thought. The most absolute theoretical 
discipline, mathematics, is the only thoroughly abstract one throughout, in stark 
contrast to everything bound on experience. However, if science is not permeated 
by plausible mathematical quadripolar logic from end to end, one could end up 
daydreaming. For “daydreaming”, i.e. emotionally charged reasoning (when emo-
tions are untrained), see (Papageorgiou 2018). 
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The boundary between scientific contemplation and daydreaming may turn into 
ultra-thin specula if short of proper restrictions. 
 
Last but not least let, us note that the mutually different nature of the analytic and 
abstract sub-methods freely allows for the full number of combinatory overlaps, 
interfaces and dualities, i.e. i. (component-orientated) analytic abstraction and 
synthetic abstraction and analytic structure and synthetic structure, as well as ii. 
(attribute- or group- or property-orientated) abstract analysis and structural analysis 
and abstract synthesis and structural synthesis. The two illustrative case studies 
following are both typical instances of one such vital cross between the two 
constituent (sub-)methods, because the analysis and synthesis in both are based on 
(whether acknowledged or desired, whether observed or hypothesized / proposed / 
projected) attributes that are abstractly and/or structurally theoretical. 
 
4. Case study 1: the primitive ritual ΚΛΜ  
            (and its material counterpart ΨΧΩ) 
In our quest for a rigorous epistemonic description and classification of the fine 
arts, we are often typically trapped in a viewing that starts from (allegedly) “singu-
lar arts”, not well defined in a “self-evident” or conventional statement of what is a 
single / simple self-contained fine art and what is not, starting from the classical 
points of view of aesthetics etc. and working synthetically towards combinations. 
However, this approach leaves much to be desired in the realm of criteria and 
procedures as regards consistency, completeness and rigour. In working towards 
the said textbook, the second author of this paper decided to take an alternative 
route suggested by the British philosophers of the late 19
th
 century, talking about 
the performing arts as splinters that have spun off an original primeval primitive 
ritual. According to this theoretical description, arts such as music, song, dance, 
poetry and drama have developed as more specialized manifestations of that ritual; 
and that is a unified one, a “unity”, critically seen, from a point of view that may 
even be dismissed in a derogatory sense as primitive, profane, pagan, superstitious, 
ignorant, uncivilized, crude, backward, vulgar and perhaps sad and instigated by 
fear. Most typically, David Hume has extensively written about (and against) this 
ritual and its legacy (search and see, e.g., a number of relevant excerpts in Hume 
1889 and elsewhere). 
In using the filters of the analytic method, as applied to the rich primitive hi-
story and its historical / archaeological relics, one may see that, indeed, the 
primitive ritual performance is not the final constructively built product in need of 
explanation, but the starting point in need of analysis. This makes our integrated 
approach not only different from the one that is standard in Western science, but its 
opposite indeed – even though we owe to them the identification of the primitive 
ritual. This also makes our approach much more productive and much more capa-
ble of explaining the whole process, predictive and predicting various interesting 
levels of the process leading from a primitive ritual to a modern performance. 
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A next logical step is the distinction between more compound and simpler fine 
arts, coming down as inherited and emancipated specialized manifestations of 
splinters or aspects of the original primeval ritual, which existed in it as compo-
nents; and here one cannot be careful enough in setting apart a singular fine art 
(e.g. music) from the corresponding artistic (e.g. musical) aspect and component of 
something more compound, as, e.g., of opera; therefore, methodical analysis must 
be precise and concise both in the successive systemic stages of analytical fragme-
ntation and also in the terminology applied so as to disambiguate rather that sin-
king deeper and deeper in confusion. 
Immediately following, comes a next spontaneous quest about all other simple 
and compound arts: where do they belong? Soon it becomes apparent that the enti-
re rest of the arts, i.e. those that do not rely on performance, are potential contri-
butors to the ritual, in that they can ritually form the physical environment, or 
“format the space”, in which the performing ritual can take place. What is impor-
tant, here, is the similar self-righteous theoretical possibility for an analytical setup, 
complete with consciousness of the differences. In any case, another very fruitful 
realization directly following is that what sets arts apart, deep down and under, 
next to the artistic scope of the process of the artist, is the material makeup of the 
product / work of art; this line of reasoning also sets a question running as to what 
the material nature and resulting identifying marker of a “work” of music, dance or 
poetry is; this question has been mathematically resolved by the second author of 
the present paper, as an outcome i. of the right question being asked so that it begs 
and has a good chance of begetting an answer and ii. of the arsenal of modern ma-
thematics – but that is an issue outside our present scope. 
What is amazing, indeed, is the realization that the two parallel and cooperating 
ternary primeval ritual processes are set apart in a first dichotomy by the fact that, 
while the ternary performing ritual is manifested in artistic activities known as 
performances, further specialized as having designers and performers, the other 
triple, separately manifesting itself in the autonomous arts of painting, sculpture 
and architecture / landscaping, produces works of art that are material bodies or 
constructs and has no interpreters or any other kind of mediators. Dealing with the 
parity between these two triples, however, should not obfuscate their differences, a 
couple of which will be discussed along the way. Let us remark a first capital 
difference here already. Much as the material and environmental arts do contribute 
to the ritual, they are not derived from it and do not originate in it, but in the 
secular arena; therefore, their relationship to the ritual is, so to speak, circu-
mstantial but not essential, or, better, “casual, not causal” – which is conceivably 
why the British philosophers raised no point about them. 
After doing all the work on his own, the second author of the present paper 
spotted an identical dual aspect of two triads involving a ternary ritual and its 
equally ternary material / environmental counterpart in a finished form; and, 
apparently, that realization became popular in the West early in the 20
th
 century, 
with the widespread impact of a staple book of research on ancient music theory by 
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illustrious scholar Rudolph Westphal, who cooperated with philosopher August 
Roßbach. Their relevant analysis and exposition was based on a volume of notes 
from the Lyceum and its lectures, edited and published in the 2
nd
 century b.c.e., by 
a Cretan scholar named Luci(l)us of Tarrha; incidentally, Tarrha was a city at the 
Eastern flank of the exit from Samaria gorge, province of Sfakia, district of Chania, 
Crete. In it they exhibit a dual triplicate scheme of i. material arts quoted from 
Luci(l)us, aptly called “arts of a finished product” (τέχναι ἀποτελεστικαί), operating 
on the monitoring abstract criterion of symmetry (συμμετρία), and ii. of performing 
arts, aptly called “arts of action” (τέχναι πρακτικαί), operating on the monitoring 
abstract criterion of rhythm (ῥυθμὸς) (Westphal 2017 p. 6); Aristotle and/or his 
associates had also devised an interesting regulatory philosophical combinatorial 
duality involving objectivity and subjectivity. 
In any case, what emerges as really amazing, and as an indicator of the advan-
ced level of classical Greek philosophy in its maturity, is that the main analytically 
superlative pattern of these thoughts had already been made in the space of 
Aristotle’s school, missing only in the further distinctive steps we have taken, i.e. i. 
in the mathematical identification of the “work of a performing art” ii. in reco-
gnizing and laying out the essential successive stages of an analytic breakdown and 
synthetic re-emergence of its splinters, iii. in setting apart the opposing senses of 
analytic breakdown and synthetic (re-)integration, including devising criteria for 
telling them apart, iv. in the analytic terminological “cleanup” for disambiguating 
between integral autonomous arts and artistic components. 
 
MATERIAL ARTS    PERFORMING ARTS  
a. Objective  || Plastic (→ sculpture)  Orchestic (→ dance) 
b. Subjective  || Architecture   Harmonic (→ music) 
c. Objective-subjective || Colouring (→ painting)  Poetry    
SYMMETRY RHYTHM 
 
Another “side-effect” success of the application of the analytic method in the 
primitive ritual is the identification of the work of art. Indeed, it is all too easy to 
identify the work of art when it comes to sculpture, architecture or painting. But 
what about music, poetry and dance? Is the work of art the specific interpretation 
of, say, a musical piece? Is it the score? Is a lost score that has never been played a 
work of art (yes it is!)?  
Through the analytic method one is able to say that a work of a performing art 
essentially constitutes a set of all possible performances: ones that have or have not 
been carried out in the past, and ones that shall or shall not be carried out in the 
future – each and every one of the specific performances being equivalent to all 
others. The work of art, is therefore, based on the axiom of choice, an equivalence 
class of all performances, future and past, actual and potential. 
The following analytically rigorous and complete presentation of the analytic / 
synthetic model and its stages regards our finished product. It was first sketched in 
the Open University textbook we referred to (Λέκκας, 2003b), then completed in 
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an unpublished explanatory letter to the students and finally published complete for 
the first time in the present form in a recent collective volume in Greek, attempting a 
coordinative approach towards a structural theory of art (which is what its title means), 
including a fuller meticulous parallel coverage of both triples ΚΛΜ and ΨΧΩ 
(Λέκκας, Μερμίγκη, Παπαγεωργίου, Περιστέρης, & Χαντζής 2018 pp. 113-117). 
According to this new approach, a senary analytic and synthetic duality of two 
parallel ternary artistic complexes is sketched in the figure, followed by a full 
analytic and synthetic focused coverage of the ternary primitive performing ritual 
ΚΛΜ. We deem it sufficient for its material counterpart to be presented in a 
sketchy incomplete suggestive manner, and here are the chief reasons why: 
i. first and foremost, the single exposure of the ternary performing ritual, 
immediately following its joint exposure of both sets of arts in the senary 
(dual ternary) figure, is clear-cut, well-behaved, homogeneous, lucid, easy to 
follow and sufficient on its own right; 
ii. as has already been cited above, in contrast to the performing arts, the 
material ones are “casual, not causal”, as regards the primitive ritual; 
iii. there are complications in the theoretical makeup surrounding the material 
arts, in that it is slightly but decidedly non-homogeneous, bringing 
complications surpassing an elementary conception and the desired eye-level 
clarity of perception and conception; more specifically: 
a. the unity of arts of painting and sculpture, which are originally very much 
connected in manners far surpassing a mere complementary nature, on many 
levels, reaching from their artistic components of plastic / moulding and 
colouring – oftentimes encountered in tight synergy in their dual material 
combinations, often found in common artistic products of both of them (cf. 
coloured statues and reliefs, esp. the overpainted classical Greek sculpture, 
3D tableaux), as well as in the status and artistic conscience of their creative 
artists (cf. the paintings of sculptor Michelangelo Buonarotti, or the 
sculptures of painter Pablo Picasso), as though functioning within an almost 
inseparable pair of “pictorial arts”, taught conjointly in many fine arts 
schools and academies, to the point that they often appear almost inseparable 
(painting and sculpture often are “two arts in one packaging”); 
b. in contrast, the art of architecture and its supposed constituent discipline of 
“space-scaping” (χωρονομία: chōronomia or χωροτεχνία: chōrotechnia), as 
in spatial art / spatial designing, forming and constructing creative artistic 
disciplines, all taken together, appear multiple, manifold and diversified and 
are served by several specialties that are often separate, e.g. regarding 
buildings and all other “structures” involving statics and mechanics, 
components, structural and decorative and functional demands jointly and/or 
separately, exterior and interior spaces, and thence, in the broader sense, 
complexes, gardens, exterior environments, smaller or larger or extra-large 
constructions and monuments, landscaping etc. etc., to the point that 
architecture often appears almost like a practical manifold of several arts 
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conjoined, and architects may be more or less generalized or specialized, 
much as all these directions are taught under the common educational cover 
of schools of architecture but may be also deemed as separable at the end of 
the day (architecture often is “one art in several packagings”). 
Moving back along our original direction, the primitive ternary ritual is a 
complex phenomenon, [ΚΛΜ], with three "simple" components: K (κίνησις, 
kinēsis, i.e. motion), Λ (λόγος, logos – meant as speech) and M (μέλος, melos, 
meant as the element of pitch, scale, melody, harmony and rhythm in pure music). 
Creatively primitive is something where all creation is due to the same person (e.g. 
par excellence the Greek dramatists who single-handedly wrote, composed and 
choreographed their dramas) and executionally primitive is what is performed by 
person(s) doing all, like folk improvisers of recited and sung lyrics, music and 
dance. In contrast, creatively posterior is something whose creation derives from 
the collaboration of separate creative contributors: choreographers, composers and 
text-writers, i.e. more specialized creative collaborators, whereas executionally 
posterior is a show with specialized orchestra or band musicians, singers, dancers, 
jugglers, actors reciting poems, each to their own specialized activity but not in 
common: musicians won’t (necessarily) sing, singers won’t (necessarily) dance, 
dancers won’t (necessarily) recite or sing etc. 
Then: A triad [KΛΜ] (primary event, where K = motion, Λ = speech, M = 
melos) is not immediately broken down (analyzed) into art forms consisting of a 
singular primitive component among these three: [K] (dance), [Λ] (poetry / 
literature) and [M] (music), but first in three pairs [drama], [KΛ] ("fine acting") 
and [ΛM] (song), and then in the three components / arts: dance, poetry / literature 
and music, from respective pairs (the [K], dance, from [KΛ] and [KM], and so on). 
It is synthesized ex post in the reverse order, up to the composite [K, Λ, M], 
designed by a choreographer, a text-writer or playwright and a music composer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Models of ΚΛΜ & ΨΧΩ. For acronym explanation, see text below. 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 06:42:03 |
Papageorgioy K. & Lekkas D. 86 
A. The ternary primitive performing ritual 
K: motion 
Λ: speech 
M: melos 
[ΚΛM]: primitive ternary performing ritual 
[KΛ]: the combination of motion and speech: drama, hypocrisis (stage acting) 
[ΚΜ]: the combination of motion and melos: “bare” dancing to pure music 
(without sung text) 
[ΛM]: the combination of speech and melos: song 
K <[KΛ]: dramatic / narrative movement, abstract dancing, general / abstract 
motion 
K <[KM]: dancing with specific references of form to musical accompaniment 
Λ <[ΚΛ]: the origin of drama: epic, dramatic and lyric poetry, prose 
Λ <[ΛM]: the origin of song: verse, poetry 
M <[ΚΜ]: pre-existing melos / instrumental music without formal speech 
restrictions with emphasis on the specific and abstract physical aspect (often 
programmatic) 
M <[ΛM]: the melos (tune) of the song, simple humming or vocalizing of a 
melodic form without words (but with a formal reference to speech) 
[K]: orchēsis, dance (as a singular autonomous / “pure” art) 
[Λ]: cultivated speech, literature, poetry and the art of written speech, text and its 
recitation, read out loud 
[M]: mousikē, music, in the mature sense of the word (as a singular autonomous / 
“pure” art) 
In the primitive ternary ritual, “music” can be anything that contains melos M, that 
is, whichever one from ΚΛΜ, ΚΜ, ΛΜ, Μ, Κ+Μ, Λ+Μ, Κ+Λ+Μ. One should try 
not to confuse the primary (ΚΛΜ, ΚΛ, ΚΜ, ΛΜ) with derivative / posterior / 
synthetic (K+L, K+M, L+M, K+L+M). 
 
B. The ternary material arts complex 
To end it all, on a sketchy note, the second ternary unity, fully analysed and 
synthesized in the figure above but not in the subsequent text, close to the style 
developed according to the model set by the ternary ritual in the spirit of the 
analytic method and along the same principles as those set by the school of 
Aristotle, has the following “single” (or at least “singular”) artistic components: 
Ψ: (πλαστική: plastikē): plastic / moulding, shaping 
Χ: (χρωστική: chrōstikē): colouring / tinting 
Ω: (χωρονομία: chōronomiā or χωροτεχνία: chōrotechniā): “space-scaping” spatial 
art / spatial designing, forming and constructing creative artistic disciplines (all 
terminology here on an attempted and arbitrary level, meant more as a trial basis on 
the lookout for something better, suggestions most welcome). 
These are derived as definitively specifically underlying and resulting in the three 
acknowledged categorically autonomous material arts in the said spirit: 
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[[Ψ]]: (γλυπτική: glyptikē): sculpture (as a stand-alone art) 
[[X]]: (ζωγραφική: zōgraphikē): painting (as an autonomous art) 
[Ω]: (ἀρχιτεκτονική: architectonikē): architecture (as a stand-alone art or “artistic 
complex”). 
 
5. Case study 2: the analytic model of consent 
The first author has used the analytic method to create a cladistic model for consent 
(see for example: Papageorgiou 2017b, 2017c, 2017a). Much as consent is 
becoming more and more important in everyday life, there is only a very limited 
number of types of consent, namely informed, implied, tacit and consent by proxy 
(Berg, Appelbaum, Lidz, & Parker 2001; Carmi 2003; Eyal 2011; Miller, & 
Wertheimer 2010). A more thorough approach is needed if one is to successfully 
tackle the challenges of modern society. The characteristics of our society may be 
said to be: 
 a very complex food chain; 
 production spread across the world; 
 capital not concentrated in the hands of specific “capitalists”, but rather fluid 
and spread; 
 we are participating in the digital world equally to, or even more than we do 
in the “real” world. 
How, then, should one obtain more types of consent? 
One solution would be to undertake an extensive research, within the constraints 
of our world, and to try to find all possible types of consent one would happen to 
come across. After discovering them, one would name them and describe them 
appropriately. Apart from the obvious problem of time and resources, another big 
problem of this approach would be the poor categorization that would occur. 
Describing case after case, the order would be arbitrary and, after discovering even 
more types of consent, the danger of going back and replace or correct previous 
entries is visible – thus making the system even more chaotic. 
The second solution is to discover a generator of all possible cases that would, a 
priori, produce results valid for now, as much as for the future. That kind of 
generator actually exists and is none other than the rigorous stage-by-stage 
synthetic leg of the analytic method. 
Some two hundred (200) possible variations of consent have been identified, all 
crucial towards understanding consent in depth and thus being able to identify, 
explain and make decisions about the most complex problems in our world, like 
bioethical problems; those, being a direct result of technological progress, would 
have been unthinkable, even some years before. Questions arise, having multiple 
implications in regard to personal freedom and choice – therefore consent –, 
stemming from situations such as: 
 children with genetic material from three (or more!) parents; 
 identifying criminals from DNA tests that their relatives have taken for 
medical reasons; 
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 breeding animals that grow human organs. 
 
The cladistic trees ensuing from the application of the analytic method provide an 
in principio and a priori estimation of the type of consent before we get to know 
the situation that matches any specific type of consent. Moreover, it is an inherent 
trait of the analytic method that it predicts all possible cases, existing or future 
ones. Finally, it helps towards effectively grouping the cases into coordinated 
categories, so there may be created equivalence classes with common ethical 
qualities. 
 
 
Figure 2. A cladistic tree describing informed (Εν), voluntary (Εκ), Full (Πλ), consent (Συ). 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we have attempted to describe the general principles, key features and 
thorough approach to the constitution, basic inner workings, deployment and stage-
by-stage breakup and assemblage of the cornerstone sub-method permeating the 
epistemonic method, i.e. its component known as the “analytic method”, as 
compared and contrasted with the second cornerstone sub-method, the “abstractive 
method”, both coming in complementary pairs running in opposite senses, i.e. 
analysis – synthesis, and abstraction – structure. We have also provided sketches in 
the direction of two case studies, i.e. two examples where the strengths of this 
stricter elementary formality, given in the body of the text, are made clear in both 
models about history and function of the arts (reconstruction and functional 
overview of historic facts and technical specifications) and future study (predictive 
layout for consent models/cases). 
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